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交通事故中车主责任浅析/黄登雄

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交通事故中车主责任浅析

黄登雄


(一)我国关于机动车交通事故赔偿责任承担主体的立法现状
  关于车主在交通事故赔偿中的责任,存在太多的争论。《民法通则》第123条规定:从事高空 、高压 、易燃、易爆、剧毒、放射性、高速运输工具等对周围环境有高度危险的作业造成他人损害的,应当承担民事责任;如果能够证明损害是由受害人故意造成的,不承担民事责任。此条确立了无过错责任原则在我国的侵权行为法中的适用。按照目前的通说,机动车属于高速运输工具,机动车造成的交通事故损害,无疑应当适用《民法通则》第123条的规定。
随着《道路交通安全法》的实施,《道路交通事故处理办法》终止施行,车主的垫付义务失去依据,这是否意味着车主在交通事故损害赔偿中无须再承担任何责任?答案是否定的。《道路交通安全法》对车主责任未作出明确的规定,并不是忽略了这个问题,而是因为确定承担责任的主体较为复杂,在实践中需要根据民法的有关规定和案件的具体情况确定,因此才未作出一刀切的规定,故而采用了“机动车一方”这样一个比较宽泛的用语。显然,“机动车一方”包括驾驶员和车主,甚至包括乘车人员(譬如车上人员与驾驶员争吵、车上人员发生打架致驾驶员未能专心驾车而引发交通事故等情形),既未一概肯定由车主或驾驶员承担责任,也未排除车主或驾驶员承担责任,交由法官在个案中根据民事法律的规定,再结合案件事实确定,以免产生因特别法作出硬性规定而排除了一般法律的适用,但又不合理的情形。《道路交通安全法》第76条只解决了机动车之间、机动车与非机动车、行人之间的责任分配,对于机动车一方内部及单辆机动车发生交通事故情况下的责任承担,则须根据民事法律和具体案情认定。侵权行为法的基本原则是自己责任原则,即每个人只应对自己的行为所造成的损害后果负责,侵权行为人要能够转移责任,或者他人必须替侵权行为人造成的损害后果负责,均须有法律的规定。针对交通事故中驾驶员与车主的责任承担,驾驶员系交通事故的直接侵权行为人,如果没有其转移责任的法律规定,自然应当承担侵权责任,而对于车主是否须为驾驶员的行为承担责任,则须从实际出发,进一步审查车主对交通事故发生是否有过错以及车主与实际使用人之间的关系,确定其相应的责任,简单的一概令车主承担共同赔偿责任、连带责任或不承担责任,都是不公平的。
  (二)、无过错责任产生的社会和法理基础
  1、无过错责任产生的社会基础
我们知道,从无过错责任产生的历史渊源来说,无过错责任之所以产生,是因为:19世纪,西方资本主义国家经济的迅速发展,导致工业灾害频生、交通事故骤增、公害严重损害人们的生命健康以及产品缺陷经常导致消费者的严重损害。而且在现代工业事故中,基于工人过失或不可抗力的事件占有相当大的比重。在这种情况下,人们试图寻找一种较之传统过错责任原则更为严格的法律对策对受害人提供保护和救济。于是在实行过错推定和举证责任倒置之后,进一步产生了无过错责任。无过错责任是从整个社会利益之均衡、不同社会群体力量之对比,以及寻求补偿以息事宁人的角度来体现民法的公平原则的,它反映了高度现代化社会化大生产条件下的公平正义观,也带有社会法学的某种痕迹。无过错责任对于个别案件的适用可能有失公允,但它体现的是整体的公平和正义。无过错责任其实就是一种危险责任,即因所从事的作业活动具有高度的危险而产生的责任。
  2、无过错责任产生的法理基础
从危险责任的法理来说,侵权行为法中之所以产生危险责任这一归责原则是基于以下原因:
其一,风险开启理论。从事危险活动,或者占有、使用危险物品的人本身制造了对他人人身、财产权益造成损害的危险,因此作为危险源的开启者,当然需要承担责任;
其二,风险控制与分散理论。从事危险活动或者占有、使用危险物品的人对于这些活动或物品的性质具有最为真切的认识,也最具有能力控制危险的现实化,因此作为危险的控制者,其应当承担责任。而且通过法定的强制责任保险以及商业保险,这些人完全有能力将风险加以分散;
其三,报偿理论。从事危险活动或者占有、使用危险物品的人从这一活动中获得了利益,基于享受利益者承担风险的原则,其应当承担责任。具体到交通事故中,一个人购买了一辆车,他就能够支配该车的运行,并从该车的运行中获得利益,这种利益可以多种形式体现,用于生产经营、出租可获取经济利益,自用则获得工作生活的便利,但拥有车辆的同时也为社会增添了一个合法的危险物,给社会带来潜在的危险,因此,作为车辆的保有人,应当承担相应的危险责任。
从无过错责任产生的社会和法理基础可知,机动车损害赔偿责任的负担以法定义务为依据,是一种“危险责任”,其责任主体应包括机动车的所有者和使用者。首先是汽车的所有人(车主),亦即保有人,一般情况下,车主对其车辆握有支配权,运营的利益归属也归车主;其次是车辆使用人,车辆使用人如果从驾驶车辆这一高度危险的活动中获得了便利或者运营利益,也应当成为承担危险责任的主体。作为雇员的机动车驾驶员,其从事高度危险作业所获得的只是谋生的工资,没有获得高风险作业下的高利益,虽车辆的具体操作是自己掌握,但运行支配受车主的控制,运行利益归属车主,因此,法律规定雇员的责任由雇主承担。
  (三)我国司法实践对机动车保有人的判断标准
我国司法实践对承担无过错责任的机动车保有人的判断标准明确采取了运行支配说与运行利益说。《最高人民法院关于被盗机动车辆肇事后由谁承担损害赔偿责任问题的批复》答复“使用盗窃的机动车辆肇事,造成被害人物质损失的,肇事人应当依法承担损害赔偿责任,被盗机动车辆的所有人不承担损害赔偿责任。”其法理基础在于被盗机动车辆的所有人非自愿地丧失了对车辆的控制和支配,不具有运行支配权和运营利益,因而不承担责任,该答复未排除车辆在正常运营下车辆所有人的责任。《最高人民法院关于连环购车未办理过户手续原车主是否对机动车发生交通事故致人损害承担责任的复函》则认为:“连环购车未办理过户手续,因车辆已交付,原车主既不能支配该车的运营,也不能从该车的运营中获得利益,故原车主不应对机动车发生交通事故致人损害承担责任。”该复函基本上反向明确了车主对机动车发生交通事故致人损害要承担责任,只是要确定谁是真正车主。负责起草该批复的杨永清法官对该批复的解读为:“根据危险责任思想和报偿责任理论来确定机动车损害赔偿的责任主体,具体操作就是通过‘运行支配’和‘运行利益’两项标准加以把握。所谓运行支配通常是指,可以在事实上支配管领机动车之运行的地位。而所谓运行利益,一般认为是指因机动车运行而生的利益。换言之,某人是否属于机动车损害赔偿责任的主体,要从其是否对该机动车的运行于事实上位于支配管理的地位和是否从机动车的运行中获得了利益两个方面加以判明。进一步说,某人是否是机动车损害赔偿的责任主体,以该人与机动车之间是否有运行支配和运行利益的关联性加以确定。”
  (四)、车主承担责任的类型
  根据以上法律规定、司法解释和理论,按照运行支配与运行利益说,车主承担责任的类型主要有以下几种:
  1、自己责任:在驾驶员就是车主的情况下,驾驶员的责任就是车主自己的责任。
  2、雇主责任:在驾驶员是在从事雇佣活动中发生交通事故的,驾驶员与车主之间的责任承担应依据《最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释》第9条予以确定。
  3、连带责任:在车辆有安全隐患或车主有过错的情况下,车主与车辆使用人构成共同侵权,车主责任应依据《最高人民法院关于审理人身损害赔偿案件适用法律若干问题的解释》第3条予以确定。
  4、不承担责任:①因被盗、被抢等车主意志外原因,导致车辆被他人控制,进而发生道路交通事故;②如果名义车主提供了充分证据证实车辆确已实际移转,且名义车主自身没有过错,真正车主也承认其车主身份,在这种情况下,名义车主可不承担责任。
  5、在一定范围内承担共同赔偿责任:车主与实际使用人之间存在承包经营、挂靠、租赁等经济利益关系,车主对交通事故的发生也没有过错,则应在一定范围内承担赔偿责任。
  6、补偿责任:车辆被借用,车主从车辆的使用中不获取经济利益,对交通事故中的发生也没有过错,依据《民法通则》第123条及公平原则确定车主承担一定的责任,主要考虑应确保交通事故造成的人身损害能够得到适当补偿。
  对于上述分类中的自己责任、雇主责任、连带责任和不承担责任,已有法律的明确规定,应没有争议。司法实践存在较大争议的是出租车辆与出借车辆两种情形下的责任承担。
  (五)正确区分以营利为目的的车辆出租与纯友情的车辆出借,合理划分车主责任承担。
确定车主在交通事故致人损害中应承担何种责任及数额,应区分以营利为目的的出租车辆行为与不具有营利目的的纯粹的友情借用车辆行为。
  1、以营利为目的车辆出租的车主责任 
车辆所有人将其车辆投入以营利为目的的出租经营,显然属于从事高度危险作业,具有典型的运营经济利益,表面上看,出租人将车辆出租给租用人后,就丧失了对出租车辆的控制和支配,让其承担责任似有不公,其实不然。车辆的所有人对出租车辆负有维修保养,确保车辆保持适于运营的良好状态的义务;对租用人负有谨慎审查,确保将车辆出租给驾驶技术熟练的驾驶员,以尽可能降低交通事故发生风险的义务。而实际上,车辆出租人为追求营利目的,对车辆租用人的审查仅限于表面形式审查,只审查有无驾驶证,对租用人的驾驶技术熟练程度无法审查,更无法对出租车辆的转借转租进行控制,无疑大大增加了汽车这种合法的危险物对社会可能造成损害的风险。车辆所有人失去对出租车辆的控制和支配是由于自身追求营利目的的主观故意行为,与被盗机动车辆的所有人非自愿地丧失了对车辆的控制和支配完全不同,车辆出租人对因追求营利目的而主动放弃约定时间内车辆支配权并由此造成的事故潜在危险应承担无过错的危险责任。最高人民法院在被盗车辆案批复及连环购车案复函两案中的亦反向确定了车主应承担损害赔偿责任。
  至于出租车辆的车主应承担责任的限额,一概让车主承担连带责任是不合理的,这样会扼杀了整个租车行业的发展,不利于社会经济的发展;但车主不承担任何责任也是不合法、不合理的,这会造成出租车辆的车主只享受从事汽车营运这种高度危险作业所带来的利润,而不需承担从事高度危险作业所带来的风险,助长唯利是图,降低或省去采取措施防范高危作业事故发生的投入,加大整个社会的交通公共安全隐患,也不符合《民法通则》第123条规定的无过错责任原则。让出租车辆的车主承担无过错责任,也并不是要将车主置于清家荡产的地步,而是为了促进出租车辆行业的长期、健康发展。为弥补或减轻车辆运营高危作业给第三者或车上人员造成损害的风险,同时也降低和分散车主经营车辆出租的风险,车主可通过积极、主动投保交强险和商业三者险、车上人员险来降低和化解车辆运营风险。机动车发生交通事故对第三人的损害,可通过投保交强险和商业三者险来获得赔偿,对于本车上人员所造成的损害,可通过投保车上人员险来获得赔偿,亦即从事车辆出租运营的车主,由于其对社会公共安全的潜在危险加大,比纯粹个人使用的私家车主应当负有更多的投保义务,除投保交强险外,还应当投保适当金额的商业三者险、车上人员险,以增强自己的偿还能力,负起与通过高度危险作业获取运营利益相对称的社会义务。此种加重的义务虽然法律尚未作出规定,但法院可以通过个案的判决逐步引导确立某些社会关系的建立所应遵循的公平的行业规则,分散不确定的交通事故可能给特定的受害人造成沉重的经济负担或难以弥补的损失的风险,而车辆出租人为承担此投保义务增加的费用则可通过整个车辆出租行业的普遍适当增加租车费用转嫁给车辆承租人,其实质仍为出租人代承租人投保。对于因使用人的原因致使保险公司有合理理由拒付保险赔偿的,出租车辆的车主仍应当在与交强险、三者险或车上人员险相适应的限额内与使用人共同承担损害赔偿责任,并不得以车主在交通事故中无过错而免责,以促使车主在从事车辆出租运营中尽到最大谨慎注意义务,最大程度地降低交通事故发生率,促进整个社会的和谐发展,此亦即法律规定从事高度危险作业造成他人损害的应承担无过错责任之立法初衷。出租的车辆在交通事故中也可能受到损坏甚至报废,或许有人认为在这种情况下再让车主承担对第三人或车上人员的无过错责任有失公允,其实是合理的。因为车主的财产损失与第三人或车上人员的生命健康权损害是不可相比的,车辆财产的损失可以通过保险获得赔偿或向事故责任人索赔,即使在向保险公司或事故责任人索赔受阻的情形下,也可通过先前或以后的车辆租赁收入得到补偿而修复,但第三人或车上人员的生命却是无法挽回的,即使受伤者通过治疗身体得到康复,其所受到的心灵创伤也是难以抚平的。
  2、纯粹友情行为出借车辆的车主责任
对于纯粹因友情行为而借出车辆的车主,由于现在一般的私用家庭轿车已非高消费产品,已有较大的普及面,并有逐渐发展成为日常交通工具的趋势,亲友、同事之间一时之需借用车辆成为可能,但私家车车主一般均不太情愿借出,只是碍于情面、维系友情而借用,而且绝大多数私家车的车主在将车辆借给朋友使用时,都会尽到非常谨慎的注意义务,具有不良嗜好或驾驶技术生疏的借用人一般会受到朋友的婉拒,友情借用而发生交通事故的机率相对要低得多,对社会公共安全的潜在危险要小得多。如果因友情借用车辆发生的交通事故对车主课以较重的损害赔偿义务,无异于禁止友情借用行为,这将导致社会人际关系的冷漠,妨碍同事之间、亲友之间关系的正常交往,有悖于人情常理,因此,不应当对友情借用车辆行为课以较重的赔偿义务。但友情借用行为车主不承担任何责任也是不合法、不合理的,毕竟这个合法的危险物是车主的,而且车主保有车辆获得了生活与工作的便利,不承担责任与《民法通则》第123条的规定精神不符,而且也会导致车主对自己支配的合法危险物不能尽到最大的谨慎注意义务。
友情借用车辆情形下车主的赔偿责任,应较以营利为目的出租车辆的车主责任要轻得多,除适用无过错责任原则之外,还应适用公平原则,其性质应为补偿责任而非赔偿责任,因车主相对于受害人而言应具有一定的经济承担能力。赔偿限额在车主已投保交强险和车上人员险的情况下,仅应以保险金承担赔偿责任,在因使用人的原因致保险公司有合理的理由拒赔的情况下,车主承担的责任不应超过车上人员险可获得赔偿的一半。
  参考文献:
1、中国法院网《试论道路交通事故损害赔偿责任的主体问题》任卫利 周瑞生
2、中国法院网《新交法在当前审判实践中存在的主要问题和对策》高海鹏
3、道路交通安全法第七十六条法律精神解析 张新宝
4、机动车损害赔偿责任主体之研究(程啸)
5、论机动车损害赔偿责任及其立法应然状态 于敏

国务院办公厅转发劳动部、人事部关于进一步落实外商投资企业用人自主权意见的通知

国务院办公厅


国务院办公厅转发劳动部、人事部关于进一步落实外商投资企业用人自主权意见的通知
国务院办公厅



劳动部、人事部《关于进一步落实外商投资企业用人自主权的意见》,已经国务院批准。现转发给你们,请认真贯彻执行。

附:劳动部、人事部关于进一步落实外商投资企业用人自主权的意见

一九八八年四月二十五日


为了改善投资环境,以利于沿海地区经济发展战略的贯彻实施,现就进一步落实外商投资企业用人自主权问题,提出如下意见:
一、外商投资企业需要的工人、专业技术人员和经营管理人员(包括高级管理人员),由企业面向社会公开招聘,也可以从中方合营者推荐的人员中选聘,在本地区招聘职工不能满足需要时,可以跨地区招聘。
二、外商投资企业从在职职工中招聘所需人员时,有关部门和单位应当积极支持,允许流动,不得采用不合理收费、收回住房等手段加以限制。如果原单位无理阻拦,被聘用职工可以提出辞职,辞职后其工龄可连续计算。如有争议,当事人可以向所在地区劳动争议仲裁委员会或当地政
府授权的人才交流服务机构申请仲裁,对仲裁决定,有关各方必须执行。必要时,可以由当地劳动、人事部门直接办理被聘用职工的调转手续。
三、外商投资企业跨省、自治区、直辖市招聘职工,不再报省级劳动、人事部门批准,有关地区的劳动、人事部门要做好组织、协调和服务工作。
四、中方企业同外商合营时,原企业的职工可由合营企业按照需要择优聘用。对未被聘用的人员,中方合营者和企业主管部门要妥善安置,当地政府应积极协助做好调剂工作。
五、外商投资企业按照合同和有关规定辞退职工,任何部门、单位或个人不得干预。对被辞退的职工,原属借调、借聘的,由原单位接收;属于应聘的,到应聘前所在地区的劳动服务公司或人才交流服务机构进行待业登记,可以由有关部门介绍就业、自愿组织起来就业,也可以自谋职
业。
六、对在中外合资经营、合作经营企业担任董事长、董事的中方人员,在任期内不得擅自调动他们的工作,如需调动时,委派单位应征求该企业的审批机构和合营他方的意见。外商投资企业聘用的中方高级管理人员,在其聘用合同期内,未经企业董事会和总经理同意,任何部门和单位
无权调动他们的工作。
七、本《意见》与国务院发布的《中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定》(国发〔1980〕199号)的第三条、第六条,《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法实施条例》(国发〔1983〕148号)的第三十四条,《关于鼓励外商投资的规定》(国发〔1986〕95号)的第十
五条,《国营企业劳动争议处理暂行规定》(国发〔1987〕69号)的第二条和原劳动人事部发布的《中外合资经营企业劳动管理规定实施办法》(劳人劳〔1984〕1号)第一二三条规定有抵触的,均按本《意见》执行。
八、各地区和有关部门应当加强宣传教育,使各级领导和广大职工提高认识,确保外商投资企业能够按照国际上通行的办法行使用人自主权。对于违反有关法规和本《意见》,以及在招聘、辞退职工中搞不正之风的,应当进行批评教育,情节严重的,应根据实际情况追究法律责任或给
予行政处分。



1988年1月5日


The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.